December 12 (Wednesday) Plenary Talk: 9-10 Kenneth Arrow: Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History. Equilibrium: 10:30-12:10 Chen Lihua, Yinyu Ye and Jiawei Zhang. A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimizatio Hartwig Bosse, Jaroslaw Byrka and Evangelos Markakis. New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games Heiner Ackermann, Paul Goldberg, Vahab Mirrokni, Heiko Roeglin and Berthold Voecking. A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets Haralampos Tsaknakis and Paul Spirakis. An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Pena and Tuomas Sandholm. Gradient-based algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in extensive form games Plenary Talk: 2:00-3:00pm Herbert Scarf: My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of its Applications 3:00-4:00 Information Market: 1 hour Yiling Chen, Daniel Reeves, David Pennock, Robin Hanson and Rica Gonen. Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets Mark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho So and Yinyu Ye. Pari-mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance Gabrielle Demange. Information sharing communities 4:30-6:10 Sponsored Auction: 2hours: Danny Kuminov and Moshe Tennenholtz. Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions Jennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li and John Langford. Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions Muthukrishnan, Martin Pal and Zoya Svitkina. Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising Zoe Abrams and Arpita Ghosh. Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions Li Liang and QI QI. Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction December 13 (Thursday) Network Economics: 8:00-9:40 Dimitris Fotakis and Paul Spirakis. Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari and Shie Mannor. Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics Heiner Ackermann, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fangh?nel and Berthold Voecking. Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets? Aristotelis Giannakos, laurent gourves, J¨Śrme Monnot and Vangelis Paschos. On the performance of congestion games for optimum satisfiability problems Alex Hall, Evdokia Nikolova and Christos Papadimitriou. Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities Mechanism Design I: 10:10-11:10 Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek and Makoto Yokoo. False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel Reeves, David Pennock and Ryan Fugger. Mechanism Design on Trust Networks Samuel Ieong, Anthony Man-Cho So and Mukund Sundararajan. Stochastic Mechanism Design Plenary Talk: 11:10-12:10 Vijay V. Vazirani: Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm Afternoon: Short Talks (in paralell sessions) Social Networks: 2:00-3:40 Eyal Even-Dar and Asaf Shapira. Eyal Even-Dar and Asaf Shapira. A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks Yair Halevi and Yishay Mansour. A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T-H. Hubert Chan and MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi. Making Money by Pricing Below Cost Felix Brandt and Felix Fischer. PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe and Mahyar Salek. Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks Advertisement Pricing I: 2:00-3:40 Sudhir Singh, Vwani Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi and Behnam Rezaei. Capacity constraints and the inevitability of mediators in adword auctions Zoe Abrams, Arpita Ghosh and Erik Vee. Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions Gagan Goel and Aranyak Mehta. Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids Rica Gonen and Elan Pavlov. An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget Eyal Even-Dar, Michael Kearns and Jennifer Wortman. Sponsored Search with Contexts Computational General Equilibrium: 4:10-5:50 Benton McCune. Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences Rahul Garg and Sanjiv Kapoor. Market Equilibrium using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities Nimrod Megiddo and Vijay Vazirani. Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets Chinmay Karande and nikhil devanur. Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes Deeparnab Chakrabarty and Nikhil Devanur. On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Network Games: 4:10-5:50 Martin Gairing and Florian Schoppmann. Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvo-Armengol and David Parkes. The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games Kurt Nielsen and Tomas Toft. Secure Relative Performance Scheme Stefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom and Shmuel Zaks. Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Hossein Falaki. The Wi-Fi Roaming Game 6:30-9:00pm Reception/Dinner December 14 (Friday) Algorithmic Issues: 8:00-10:00 Alexander Skopalik and Heiner Ackermann. On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games David Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David Manlove and Gregg O'Malley. The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs Kyle Burke and Shang-Hua Teng. A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game Ola Rozenfeld and Moshe Tennenholtz. Group Dominant Strategies Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien and Klaus W. Wagner. Weighted Boolean Formula Games Qizhi FANG and Liang Kong. Core Stability Of Vertex Cover Games Mechanism Design II: 10:30-11:30 Edith Elkind and Shaheen Fatima. Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions Davide Bil¨°, Luca Forlizzi, Luciano Gual¨¤ and Guido Proietti. Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and other Graph Traversal Problems Yvonne Bleischwitz, Burkhard Monien and Florian Schoppmann. To be or not to be (served) Plenary Talk: 11:30-12:30 Christos Papadimitriou: The Computation of Equilibrium Afternoon: Short Talks (in paralell sessions) Advertisement Pricing II: 2:00-3:40 Zoe Abrams and Michael Schwarz. Ad Auction Design and User Experience Zoe Abrams and Erik Vee. Personalized Ad Delivery when Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm Kuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu and Michael Kearns. Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search Mohammad Mahdian and Kerem Tomak. Pay-per-action model for online advertising Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty and Sreenivas Gollapudi. Public Advertisement Broker Markets Mechanism Design III: 2:00-3:40 Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger and Moshe Tennenholtz. K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-Cooperative Computation Aries Wei Sun. Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Mukund Sundararajan. Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search Qiqi Yan. On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen and Elan Pavlov. Characterizing Truthful Market Design