RESEARCH STATEMENT

XINDONG TANG

My research during the Ph.D. program mainly focuses on the Nash Equilibrium Problem and its generalization. The (generalized) Nash equilibrium problem is a kind of games to find strategies for a group of players such that each player’s objective function is optimized, for given other players’ strategies. Besides, my interest lies in the applications of equilibriums problems with a data-driven background.

1. The Nash Equilibrium Problems

Let $N$ be the number of players. Suppose the $i$th player’s strategy is the variable $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}$ (the $n_i$-dimensional Euclidean space over the real field $\mathbb{R}$). Denote the vector of all players’ strategies as $x := (x_1, \ldots, x_N)$. The total dimension of all players’ strategies is $n := n_1 + \cdots + n_N$. For convenience, we use $x_{-i}$ to denote the subvector of all players’ strategies except the $i$th one.

The Nash equilibrium problem of polynomials (NEPP) is to find $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that for each $i \in N$, the $i$th player aims to find $x_i$ minimizing the following optimization problem

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \\
& \text{s.t. } g_{i,j}(x_i) \geq 0 (j \in I_i), \\
& \quad g_{i,j}(x_i) = 0 (j \in E_i).
\end{align*}
$$

Such a solution $x$ to the NEPP is called a Nash equilibrium (NE).

Suppose $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_N)$ is a NE. Under some regularity conditions at $x_i$, there exist Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_{i,j}$ such that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition of the $i$th player’s optimization hold for each $i \in [N]$. When the constraining tuple is nonsingular, the Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_{i,j}$ can be expressed as polynomials in $x$, i.e., there exists polynomials $\lambda_{i,j}(x) \in \mathbb{R}[x]$ such that $\lambda_{i,j}(x) = \lambda_{i,j}$ for all $(x, \lambda_i)$ satisfying the KKT condition. When nonsingularity is satisfied, the linear independent constraint qualification condition holds.

Assume for each player, the constraining tuple is nonsingular. If $x$ is a NE, then it satisfies

$$
\begin{align*}
& \nabla_x f_i(x) - \sum_{j=1}^{m_i} \lambda_{i,j}(x) \nabla_x g_{i,j}(x_i) = 0 (i \in [N]), \\
& g_{i,j}(x_i) = 0 (j \in E_i, i \in [N]), \\
& \lambda_{i,j}(x) g_{i,j}(x_i) = 0 (j \in E_i, i \in [N]), \\
& g_{i,j}(x_i) \geq 0 (j \in I_i, i \in [N]), \\
& \lambda_{i,j}(x) \geq 0 (j \in I_i, i \in [N]).
\end{align*}
$$

The points satisfying (1.2) are called KKT points. Denote $\mathcal{G}$ the set of KKT points. Consider the following optimization problem:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min_{x} |x|^T \cdot \Theta \cdot |x|_1 \\
& \text{s.t. } x \in \mathcal{G}.
\end{align*}
$$
Here $\Theta$ is a generic positive definite matrix. If $x$ is a NE, then it is a feasible point of (1.3). If (1.3) is infeasible, then the NEP has no NE. Otherwise, let $u := (u_i, u_{-i})$ be a minimizer of (1.3). Consider the optimization problem for each $i \in [N]$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\omega_i := & \min_{x} f_i(x_i, u_{-i}) - f_i(u_i, u_{-i}) \\
& \text{s.t. } g_{i,j}(x_i) = 0 (j \in E_i), \\
& \quad g_{i,j}(x_i) \geq 0 (j \in I_i).
\end{align*}
$$

(1.4)

If all the optimal values $\omega_i \geq 0$, then $u$ is a Nash Equilibrium. However, if one of them is negative, say, $\omega_i < 0$, then $u$ is not a NE. Suppose $u$ is not a NE. For each $i$ such that $\omega_i < 0$, let $U_i$ be the set of minimizers, and $K_i$ be a set containing $U_i$, then consider the following optimization:

$$
\begin{align*}
\min_{x} [x]^T \cdot \Theta \cdot [x] \\
\text{s.t. } x \in G, \\
f_i(v, x_{-i}) - f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq 0 (v \in K_i, i \in [N]).
\end{align*}
$$

(1.5)

The $u$ is not a feasible point of (1.5), since $f_i(v, x_{-i}) - f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) < 0$ for all $v$ that is a minimizer of (1.4) such that $\omega_i < 0$. On the other hand, each NE is still feasible for (1.5). Therefore, we can solve (1.5) again for an optimizer. If it is verified to be a NE, then we are done. If it is not, we update $K_i$ by $K_i \cup U_i$. Repeating this procedure, we are able to find a Nash equilibrium. We propose an Algorithm to find a NE based on the statement above (see [1, Theorem 3.1]). The following is the convergence result of the algorithm.

**Theorem 1.1.** Assume for each $i \in [N]$, the constraining polynomial tuple $g_i$ is nonsingular. Let $\lambda_{i,j}(x)$ be the polynomial expressions of Lagrange multipliers, the $G$ be the feasible set of (1.5) with $K_i = \emptyset$ for each $i \in [N]$ and $G^*$ be the set of all NEs. If the complement $G \setminus G^*$ is a finite set, i.e., the cardinality $\ell := |G \setminus G^*| < \infty$, then the proposed algorithm must terminate within at most $\ell$ loops, either report the nonexistence of NEs, or find one NE if it exists.

Moreover, assume that $x^*$ is a Nash Equilibrium produced by our proposed algorithm, i.e., $x^*$ is also a minimizer of (1.5). If $x^*$ is an isolated NE (e.g., this is the case if there are finitely many NEs), we proposed a method to find more Nash equilibria. Particularly, under the assumptions of Theorem 1.1, if each NE is an isolated KKT point, and there are finitely many NEs, then the proposed method can find all of them. Please note that for a generic NEP, there are finitely many KKT points [1, Theorem A.1], hence our algorithms have finite convergence, and the proposed method for finding more Nash equilibria can find all of them.

The Moment-SOS hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations are used to solve the polynomial optimization problems in our algorithms. We refer to [1] for more details about implementing the Moment-SOS relaxation and the convergence results. Under generic assumptions, we can compute a Nash equilibrium if it exists, and detect the nonexistence if there is none. Moreover, we can get all Nash equilibria if there are finitely many of them.


Consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem of polynomials (GNEPP), i.e., the game that to find $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that each $x_i$ is an optimizer of the $i$th
player’s optimization problem

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} & \quad f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq 0 (j \in I_i), \\
& \quad g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) = 0 (j \in E_i),
\end{align*}
\] (2.1)

where all \( f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \) and \( g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) \) are polynomial functions in \( x \). A solution \( x \) satisfying the above is called a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). Please note in GNEPs, the \( i \)th player’s feasible set depends on other player’s strategies (compared with NEPs).

The Gauss-Seidel method is an iterative method for GNEPs that solves each player’s subproblem alternatively. It requires global minimizers for the occurring optimization problems in each loop. The following is the general framework of the Gauss-Seidel method:

**Algorithm 2.1.** For the GNEP of (2.1), do the following:

1. **Step 1.** Choose a feasible starting point \( x^{(0)} = (x_1^{(0)}, \ldots, x_N^{(0)}) \), a positive regularization parameter \( \tau^{(0)} \) and let \( k := 0 \).
2. **Step 2.** If \( x^{(k)} \) satisfies a suitable termination criterion, stop.
3. **Step 3.** For \( i = 1, \ldots, N \), compute a global minimizer \( x_{i}^{(k+1)} \) of the optimization

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} & \quad f_i(x_{1}^{(k)}, \ldots, x_{i-1}^{(k)}, x_i, x_{i+1}^{(k)}, \ldots, x_{N}^{(k)}) + \tau^{(k)} \| x_i - x_i^{(k)} \|_2^2 \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq 0 (j \in I_i), \\
& \quad g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) = 0 (j \in E_i).
\end{align*}
\] (2.2)

4. **Step 4.** Choose a new regularization parameter \( \tau^{(k+1)} \in [0, \tau^{(k)}] \).
5. **Step 5.** Let \( x^{(k+1)} := (x_1^{(k+1)}, \ldots, x_N^{(k+1)}) \), \( k := k + 1 \), and go to Step 2.

In the above, the (2.2) is called a regularized optimization for the \( i \)th player. In practice, the Gauss-Seidel method performs well for solving GNEPPs. As demonstrated in [2], it can compute equilibria for many problems, some of which are nonconvex and very hard to be solved by other existing methods. However, there are several concerns when using the Gauss-Seidel method to solve GNEPPs.

- In Step 3 of Algorithm 2.1, one needs to solve the regularized optimization problem (2.2) for a global minimizer. For a general GNEP without convexity assumption, this is very difficult. For the GNEPPs, since the defining functions are polynomials, we use the Moment-SOS relaxations to find global minimizers of optimization problems (2.2). These relaxations can solve the polynomial optimization problems globally, even if they are nonconvex, and the global optimality can be verified. Moreover, when a limit point is obtained by Algorithm 2.1, we also use the Moment-SOS relaxations to check if it is a GNE or not.
- If the sequence by Algorithm 2.1 converges, is the limit point guaranteed to be a GNE? In [2], we give a negative answer to this question, that the [2, Example 3.5] shows a limit point may not be a solution to the GNEPP. However, we proved that if the feasible map \( x_{-i} \to X_i(x_{-i}) \) is inner semicontinuous, and the regularization parameter \( \tau^{(k)} \to 0 \), then the limit point by Algorithm 2.1 must be a GNE [2, Theorem 3.7].
- It is well known that the Gauss-Seidel method is not guaranteed to converge for all the GNEPs. The generalized potential game (GPG) is a kind
of GNEP such that the Gauss-Seidel method has a guaranteed convergence. We give a necessary condition for a GNEPP to be a GPG. Based on this necessary condition and Putinar’s positivstellensatz, we propose a numerical certificate to check if a GNEP is GPG or not. This is the first method that can be implemented numerically for checking GPGs, to the best of the author’s knowledge.

In [2], we use the Moment-SOS relaxations to solve occurring polynomial optimization problems in the Gauss-Seidel method. Numerical experiments showing that the Gauss-Seidel method is efficient for solving many GNEPPs, even if the players’ optimization problems are nonconvex. We also present some examples of using the numerical certificate to verify some GNEPs being GPGs.

3. Convex Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

In this sequel, we consider GNEPs with convexity assumptions on each player’s optimization problem. We begin with the following definition of convex GNEPPs:

**Definition 3.1.** For a GNEPP defined by (2.1), we say it is convex if for all $i \in [N]$ and $x_{-i} \in \text{dom}(X_i) := \{x_{-i} : X_i(x_{-i}) \neq \emptyset\}$, the $f_i(x_i, x_{-i})$ is a convex polynomial in $x_i$ on $X_i(x_{-i})$, the $(g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}))_{j \in E_i}$ are convex polynomials in $x_i$, and $(g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}))_{j \in E_i}$ are affine functions in $x_i$.

Under some regularity conditions, a feasible point $x = (x_i, x_{-i})$ is a GNE if and only if it is a KKT point, i.e., given $x_{-i}$, the KKT condition of the $i$th player’s subproblem is satisfied at $x_i$ for each $i \in [N]$.

In section 2, we study the Gauss-Seidel method for solving GNEPPs. However, the convergence is not guaranteed, even if the defining polynomials are convex. There is some existing work for finding solutions of convex GNEPs. Typically, some strong conditions are required for a guaranteed globally convergence, or one may need to solve some very difficult optimization problems. Besides, there is no concrete method can detect the nonexistence of GNEs, to the best of author’s knowledge. To this end, we study the convex GNEPP for a method that can detect the nonexistence of GNE, or find one GNE if it exists.

For a typical GNEPP, the polynomial expression for Lagrange multipliers does not exist. Therefore, we introduce the rational expression of Lagrange multipliers, i.e., polynomial tuples $(\bar{\lambda}_i(x), q_i(x))$ such that $q_i(x) \cdot \lambda = \bar{\lambda}_i(x)$ and $q_i(x) \geq 0$ hold for all critical tuples $(x, \lambda_i)$. Such expressions always exist unless there is a zero polynomial in the constraining tuple. Besides, let $\lambda_i^{(S_i)}$ be the tuple of a subset of Lagrange multipliers, we may use polynomials $\bar{\lambda}_i(x, \lambda_i^{(S_i)})$ to express other Lagrange multipliers. This is called partial polynomial expression of Lagrange multipliers.

For a GNEPP, assume one of these expressions exists for each player $i \in [N]$, and regularity conditions hold. If $x$ is a GNE, then it must satisfies

\[
\begin{align*}
q_i(x)\nabla x_i f_i(x) - \sum_{j=1}^{m_i} \bar{\lambda}_{i,j}(x, \lambda_i^{(S_i)}) \nabla x_i g_{i,j}(x) &= 0 \ (i \in [N]), \\
g_{i,j}(x) &= 0 \ (j \in \mathcal{E}_i, i \in [N]), \\
\bar{\lambda}_{i,j}(x, \lambda_i^{(S_i)}) \cdot g_{i,j}(x) &= 0 \ (j \in \mathcal{E}_i, i \in [N]), \\
g_{i,j}(x) &\geq 0 \ (j \in \mathcal{E}_i, i \in [N]), \\
\bar{\lambda}_{i,j}(x, \lambda_i^{(S_i)}) &\geq 0 \ (j \in \mathcal{E}_i, i \in [N]).
\end{align*}
\]

In the above, $q_i(x) \equiv 1$ if the $i$th player has a polynomial or partial polynomial expression of Lagrange multipliers, and $\lambda_i^{(S_i)} = \emptyset$ if the polynomial or rational
expression is exploited by the $i$th player. Denote $\mathcal{G}$ the set of all points satisfying (3.1), and let $\lambda^{(S)} = (\lambda_i^{(S)})_{i=1}^N$. Consider the following polynomial optimization problem

$$\min_{(x, \lambda^{(S)})} \left[ \begin{array}{c} x \\ \lambda^{(S)} \end{array} \right]_1^T \Theta \left[ \begin{array}{c} x \\ \lambda^{(S)} \end{array} \right]_1$$

s.t. $(x, \lambda^{(S)})\in \mathcal{G}$.

If $(x, \lambda^{(S)})$ is a feasible point of (3.2), then $x$ is a potential GNE. For a feasible point $(u, v)$ of (3.2), the $u$ represents the subvector corresponding to all player’s strategies, and $v$ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Further, we have the following result.

**Theorem 3.2.** Given GNEPP, suppose the regularity condition hold, and each player has either a rational expression or partial polynomial expression for the Lagrange multipliers. If (3.2) is infeasible, then there does not exist GNEs. Otherwise, let $(u, v)$ be a minimizer of (3.2). If $q_i(u) > 0$ for all $i \in [N]$, then $u$ is a GNE. Moreover, for all $i \in [N]$, if

i) $q_i(x_i, x_{-i}) > 0$ for all feasible points $x$ of (3.2), or

ii) $q_i(x_i, x_{-i}) > 0$ for all feasible points $x$ of the GNEP,

and $\Theta$ is a generic positive definite matrix, then solving (3.2) will either report the nonexistence of GNE, or find a GNE if it exists.

Therefore, one can solve the convex GNEPP by solving the polynomial optimization problem (3.2). The Moment-SOS hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations are used to solve the polynomial optimization problems in our algorithms. Usually, when (3.2) has a minimizer, it can be verified being a GNE. Otherwise, one may solve (3.2) with additional positivity constraints for $q_i(x)$, or change the positive definite matrix $\Theta$. We refer to [3] for more details. The numerical experiments show the efficiency of our method on convex GNEPPs, some of which are very difficult to solve by other methods.

### 4. Future work

#### 4.1. The nonconvex GNEPs

Consider the GNEPP defined by (2.1). Here we do not make any convexity assumption on the defining polynomials.

In section 3, a necessary condition for a feasible point $x$ to be GNE is given in (3.1). However, such an $x$ may, or may not be, a GNE since there is no assumption on the convexity of GNEP. When a point $u$ satisfying (3.1) but not being a GNE is obtained, we need an efficient method to find another point satisfying (3.1). Besides, to detect the nonexistence of solutions for a nonconvex GNEPP is difficult. If there is no point satisfying (3.1), then the GNEPP has no GNE. However, it is possible that the set of points satisfying (3.1) is nonempty, while there does not exist a GNE. How to exclude one or more points that is not a GNE? How to detect the nonexistence of GNE, given (3.1) has solutions? These questions are almost open, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, an efficient method to find GNEs for nonconvex GNEPPs is still in demand.

#### 4.2. Stochastic GNEPs

We are also interested in the equilibrium problems with a stochastic structure, i.e., the equilibrium problems defined with random parameters. These problems have broad applications, especially in data science.
The stochastic GNEP (SGNEP) is such a kind of problem. The SGNEPs are GNEPs such that for each player $i \in [N]$, the objective is an expected-value function. That is, to find $x = (x_i, x_{-i})$ such that $x_i$ minimize the following optimization for a given $x_{-i}$:

$$
\min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} \mathbb{E}_{\xi}[f_i(x_i, x_{-i}, \xi)] \\
\text{s.t.} \quad g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq 0 (j \in I_i), \\
g_{i,j}(x_i, x_{-i}) = 0 (j \in E_i).
$$

(4.1)

In the above, the $\xi$ is a random vector, and the $\mathbb{E}$ denotes the expectation of a function. Typically, the distribution of $\xi$ is unknown. In particular, we are interested in SGNEP in polynomials, i.e., the SGNEPs whose defining functions are polynomials.

References

